INTRODUCTION
In this essay I will examine what I think is a neglected contribution to Newton's conception of experimental philosophy. I shall try to argue that certain works of the seventeenth-century 'Aristotelian' 1 textbook-tradition 2 (which were inspired by Aristotle's ideas on logic and sci ence) are relevant to bringing some of Newton's ideas on natural philosophy into perspective. My aim is to establish that the tradition epitomized by these textbooks is important for some 'gen er al' features of Newton's conception of science, although obviously they cannot explain all of them.
First of all, let me explain what I understand by 'general'. General features are features on a meta-level: the way natural philosophy is un der stood and conceptualized (i.e., the conception of natural philosophy as articulated by a virtuoso). They pertain to the most general and abstract level of science. Specifi c features refer to knowl edge about how natural philosophy is actually done (i.e., the actual scientifi c praxis that is followed to gain concrete knowledge about nature). I will argue that these Aristotelian text books explain the following general features of Newton's methodological ideas:
(1) In the order of things ('ordo naturae') causes come fi rst and effects follow from them; in the order of knowing we notice effects fi rst and from them try to infer the causes.
(2) Hence, one of the most important modes (i.e., 'regressus demonstrativus') in natural phi los o phy is reasoning backwards from the effects to the causes; next we reason from the causes to the effects. (3) There is a distinction between proximate causes (i.e., causes that produce their effect directly) and remote causes (i.e., causes that produce their effect by means of some in ter me di ary). On the highest level we have remote caus es, next proximate causes, and fi nally the observed effects.
Newton's causal outlook on scientifi c rea son ing (especially in the Principia) has striking parallels with this textbook-tradition. I will argue that, although Newton reinterpreted the notion of 'cause', he formulated his views on natural philosophy on a more abstract level in Ar is to te lian terminology. He recast his new notion of 'cause' in a familiar language; and it turns out that Newton veiled his innovative new style of nat u ral philosophy in Aristotelian terminology. This causal tradition has wrongly been neglected. If my claim is correct, then this article offers a more balanced view of the contribution of Aristotelianism on Newton. Newton drew from and was trained in a set of common texts and techniques, which were still the most important sources for university-trained natural phi los o phers at the mid-seventeenth century.
In the seventeenth century, Aristotle's inheritance was passed on by these textbooks on logic. Little or no attention has been paid to these books. This comes as no surprise since our knowledge of the Aristotelian tradition(s) be tween roughly 1400 and 1650 is rather poor compared to our knowledge of neo-Platonism. 3 Maurizio Mamiani however recently argued that the tract on logic, Logicae artis compendium (1615), written by Robert Sanderson, played an important role in the genesis of Isaac Newton's regulae philosophandi. 4 Sanderson's laws (such as the law of brevity) are, as far as logic and rhetoric is concerned, "the primary source of Newton's rules". 5 In this paper I will deal with such textbooks on logic from a different per spec tive: their ideas on regressus and causality. The relevant textbooks are: (1) Logica sive Ars cogitandi (originally in French, 1662) by Antoine Arnauld and Pierre Nicole; (2) Aditus ad Logicam (1613) by Samuel Smith; and (3) Institutio logicae (1687) by John Wallis.
I have chosen these books by applying two criteria: (1) the books were part of Newton's private library 6 (or they were written by natural philosophers whom Newton knew and who were contemporaries of his), and (2) the books treated scientifi c method and regressus. However, Newton did not refer to these books (or to the Aristotelian tradition). The more serious ar gu ment for studying these works is that they provide a representative sample of Ar is to te lian textbooks available to Newton and con tempo rar ies. My choice is somewhat subjective, but it points at the importance of this tradition. As Cees Leijenhorst pointed out in his recent study on Hobbes: "Although our choice of Aristotelian authors thus remains somewhat arbitrary, none the less a fairly representative sample of the different kinds of Aristotelianism en vogue in Hobbes' days is possible." 7 The same holds for Newton. The ideas on regressus are essential, not the authors as such. Only Smith's work explicitly discusses all three of the relevant ideas I have mentioned.
Most historians consider the Greek ge om e ters (such as Euclid and Pappus) as primary sources for Newton's conception of analysis and synthesis. 8 Alistair C. Crombie claims more generally that the seventeenth-century natural philosophers' model for scientifi c discovery and demonstration was the ancient mathematical method of analysis and synthesis. 9 I whole heart ed ly agree that this mathematical tradition was important to Newton. 10 Guicciardini points out that René Descartes's Geometria (fi rst Latin translation by Frans van Schooten in 1649) and John Wallis's Arithmetica infi nitorum (1655) "made the strongest impact on Newton's math e mat i cal mind". 11 Newton had a deep admiration for the geometrical writings of the ancients (especially for Pappus), which led him to crit i cize the modern symbolical mathematics. 12 Newton developed an analytical as well as a synthetical method of fl uxions. 13 He abandoned his earlier analytical style in favour of the syn thet i cal style of the ancients. 14 The mathematical tradition was a necessary ingredient, but not a suffi cient one.
That the Principia proceeds as a highly mathematical exposition (especially Book I) has probably biased the view of Newton's con cep tion of natural philosophy. Let me explain why the mathematical tradition alone does not suffi ce. In the analysis one starts from what is sought -as if it had been achieved -and by working backwards one arrives at what is known; in the synthesis one works in the other direction: one starts with what is known and arrives at what is sought. 15 This is the general idea of the math e mat i cal tradition. What seems to be neglected here is that Newton's conception of natural philosophy is explicitly causal (a feature that is obviously lacking in the mathematical tradition of analysis-synthesis, since the relation between what is sought and what is known in either direction is purely inferential) and that he corre spond ing ly favoured abductive reasoning steps. 16 I am not in any way challenging the importance of the mathematical tradition of analysis and synthesis for Newton's natural philosophy. 17 My claim is that we need to add and incorporate causal aspects that are absent in this math e mat i cal tradition: the mathematical tradition is not suffi cient to explain all aspects of Newton's natural philosophy, for a crucial element of Newton's conception of natural philosophy is left unexplained. These textbooks fi ll in this gap.
In Section 2, I will look at Newton's early training in Aristotelian philosophy, which will include a discussion of the notes from various Aristotelian authors (Joannes Magirus, Daniel Stahl and Gerardus Vossius) in Newton's Trinity notebook, and the aforementioned textbooks on logic. In Section 3, I will treat the parallels with Newton's Principia. I will not only show that several of Newton's assertions on natural phi los o phy are consistent with the Aristotelian tradition, but also that Newton's actual reasoning patterns in the Principia conform to some of the basic tenets of this tradition. Newton's conceptualization was heterogeneous and used different elements from these authors. In Section 4, I offer my conclusions, and raise questions that might guide future research.
NEWTON'S EARLY TRAINING
In this section I will discuss Newton's notes in his Trinity notebook (2.1), give some general remarks concerning the regressus-tradition (2.2), and fi nally present the relevant ideas of the aforementioned textbooks on logic (2.3).
Notes from Aristotelian Works in Add. 3996 CUL
When Newton was a student at Cambridge, study began with a heavy dose of Aristotle's logic, ethics, rhetoric and natural philosophy. 18 Aristotelianism was still the central system of thought in the educational system. In 1661 Newton as a student began to keep notes per tain ing to his studies. His Trinity notebook (Add. 3996 CUL) contained copious notes from Ar is to te lian authors such as Joannes Magirus, Daniel Stahl and Gerardus Vossius. 19 I will briefl y discuss what these works have to say on causal explanation. It will turn out that only Joannes Magirus and Daniel Stahl's books contained a thorough discussion of the Aristotelian doctrine of the causes. The two authors introduced New ton to natural philosophy. 20 Stahl wrote nothing explicit on regressus, but there are some state ments that are compatible with the works I will present in Section 3. Let us look at the books from which Newton took notes. The fi rst is Gerardus Vossius's Rheticores contractae, sive partionum oratorium, libri V (1631). 21 This material dealt with demonstration, deliberation, conjectural reasoning, and the various states of the mind. 22 The book focused on rhetoric and does not engage in a discussion of causal explanation or regressus in natural philosophy. Joannes Magirus's scholastic com pen di um on physiology, Physiologiae peripateticae: Libri sex cum commentariis (1619) does contain a presentation of the Ar is to te lian doctrine of the causes, but has no discussion of regressus in natural philosophy. 23 Newton took various notes on such topics as: motion, 24 rest, infi nity, place, vacuum, internal and external affections, 25 Aristotelian cosmology, and specifi c natural phenomena (such as eclips es, putrefaction, thunder, and rainbows). 26 Magirus defi nes physics as "the science of natural bodies (corporum naturalium scientia)": "After all, physics seeks the causes, principles and the proper affections of these natural bodies; and demonstrates the affections [of natural bodies] by their causes." 27 Magirus does not elaborate further on this, but this passage entails a twofold directionality in scientifi c research: fi nding affections, principles and causes of bodies, and demonstrating the affections by means of the (previously discovered) causes. The authors I will present in Section 3 are more explicit on this matter. Daniel Stahl's Axiomata philosophica, sub titulis XX (1645), a more advanced Ar is to te lian compendium, was of considerable interest to Newton. 28 Stahl's work is more philosophical in orientation than Magirus's. Newton took notes on: the nature of essence, actuality and po ten ti al i ty, the theory of the causes, the appetites, the will, agency and patient, matter, form, the theory of predication, the theory of genus, species, and difference, the idea of defi nition, the distinction between subject and accident, and the problem of truth and falsity. 29 "Titulus III" contains 21 rules concerning the doctrine of causes. 30 Ac cord ing to Stahl, effects are the "fi rst part of experience (prior pars patet experientia)"; only later do we know the causes of things. 31 Effects occur fi rst in our experiences, the causes only latently (cf. "incurrunt enim effectus in sensus, causis nos latentibus").
32 This is part of the human condition. This brief discussion of these textbooks shows that they would have ensured Newton's familiarity with the Aristotelian tradition. In the following section, I will add some books that were -as I will argue -of even greater im por tance with respect to the three general features mentioned in the introduction.
A Brief Note on Regressus
I begin this section by clarifying what is meant by regressus. The Paduan Aristotelians -ex em pli fi ed by Jacopo Zabarella -are usually cred it ed with elaborating Aristotle's logic of dem on stra tion into a scientifi c method of demonstration in which one fi rst reasons from the effects to the causes (resolution), and then from the causes to the effects (composition). Nicolas Jardine states that demonstrative regressus is a procedure that combines an inference from an observed effect to its proximate cause with an inference from the proximate cause to the observed effect. 33 I will adopt Jardine's terminology. Peter Dear notes:
By no means wholly original with Zabarella but closely associated with his name throughout Europe in the later sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the technique had developed from a commentary tradition that focused on Aristotle's Posterior Analytics, and in particular on Ar is to tle's distinction between two forms of dem on stra tion: apodeixis tou dioti and apodeixis tou hoti, usually latinized as demonstration propter quid and demonstration quia. 34 Aristotle's views on scientifi c inquiry which were embodied in his Posterior analytics were revived when they were rediscovered in the twelfth century. Jardine notes that regressus was often confl ated with other methods and procedures. Aristotle's distinction between two pro ce dures, one procedure going from the particular to the universal, the other from the universal to the particular, was identifi ed with the fi rst and second movement of demonstrative regressus, and likewise for his analysissynthesis distinction. 35 
The Aristotelian Textbooks on Logic
We will now take a closer look at the Aristotelian textbooks on logic. Wilbur Samuel Howell noted that even until the beginning of the eighteenth century, it looked as if English logicians had permanently turned their backs upon the possibility of reforming logical theory in the direction of the revolutionary teach ings of Bacon and Descartes, and had instead decided to do all that they could to restore the logic of Aristotle to its former pre-eminence in education and learn ing. 36 As stated earlier, I shall not treat these books exhaustively, but will focus only on the relevant features: what these authors wrote on scientifi c method and regressus. 37 Recall that I do not wish to argue that these books individually infl uenced Newton, but rather that they provide a rep re sent a tive sample of Newton's Aristotelian training. Logica sive Ars cogitandi was the fi rst printing in England of the celebrated PortRoyal logic, which remained for well over a century a standard textbook of philosophy. 38 This work was originally printed in French in 1662 (La logique ou L'art de penser). It is generally known as a Cartesian work, but the insistence of the authors on syllogistic reasoning for instance gives away the Aristotelian concerns. The fi rst Latin edition was printed in 1674, the fi rst English edition in 1685. Newton owned a Latin version of 1687. 39 In chap. II of the fourth book, entitled "De duabis Methodus, Analysi & Synthesi", the authors Antoine Arnauld and Pierre Nicole discuss the nature of (scientifi c) method ('methodus'). The aim of this method is to guide the mind from a state of oblivion to a state of knowledge of truth. This method is twofold: the one to discover Truth, which is called Analysis, or Method of Unfolding, and which may also be called Method of Invention: And the other to make it un derstood by others when it is found out, which is called Synthesis, of the Method of Composition, and may also be called the Method of Doctrine. 40 The most important difference between analysis and synthesis is this: analysis consists in be gin ning from particular cases in order to arrive at general rules; synthesis consists in positing the most general propositions in order to explain particular cases. 41 Every scientifi c investigation is carried out analytically: it attempts to resolve some question. 42 Let us look at the fi rst two kinds of 'quaestio rei'.
The fi rst, when we seek for the causes by the effects.
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The authors give some examples. From the various effects of magnets we try to infer the causes. When we notice that horror vacui effects occur in nature, we try to fi nd the cause that can pro duce such effects. From the fl ux and refl ux of the sea we try to establish the true cause. The second kind concerns the reverse:
The second is, when we seek to fi nd out the Effect by the Causes. 44 We fi nd that wind and water have a great force to move bodies. For practical purposes (e.g. technological ones), we try to manipulate this force in order to obtain desirable effects. The difference from the fi rst strategy is:
So that it may be said, the fi rst sort of Questions, whereby we seek the Causes by the Effects, include the speculative part of Physics, and the second part that seeks for the Effects by the Causes, contains the Practical part.
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In chap. XI, Arnauld and Nicole also formulate rules that are of use in science. These mainly concern the need for clarity of defi nitions and axioms. 46 Two features are important here: (1) analysis proceeds from particulars to universal (and conversely for synthesis), and (2) in (the o ret i cal) physics we infer causes from effects.
In 1613 Samuel Smith published his Aditus ad Logicam, 47 of which Newton owned the 1649 version. I will discuss some relevant fragments from Liber III. Smith notes that science involves knowing things: to know something is to know the cause of it. 48 This entails knowing what the proximate cause is ('causa proxima'). In Caput IV and V Smith deals with 'demonstratio propter quid' and 'demonstratio quod'. The fi rst kind of demonstration involves preceding from conclusions about the proximate causes, i.e. "a prioribus secundum naturam, & causis proximis". The second kind proceeds from the effects (to the proximate cause) or from the remote cause ('causa remota') to the effect. 49 So the last kind of demonstration can be done in two directions: "From a remote cause to the effect and from the effect to the [proximate] cause." 50 
Concerning this last direction type Smith writes:
The demonstration from the effect to the cause takes place when the effect is more known and the cause is unknown: then after all we show that some cause is present (and therefore the effect is present). 51 We therefore have three different reasoning steps: (1) proximate causes → effects (demonstratio propter quid); (2) effects → proximate causes (demonstratio quod type 1); and (3) remote causes → effects (demonstratio quod type 2).
The regressus-strategy is treated explicitly:
Regressus is that method of demonstration in which we collect a prior unknown cause from a known effect. Thereafter we truly demonstrate the same effect from the same cause. 52 Smith's usage of regressus is, as we have seen, not entirely identical to Jardine's description of it (see 2.2). According to Jardine, regressus is a procedure that combines an inference from an observed effect to its proximate cause with an inference from the proximate cause to the ob served effect. Smith's account is different in that it also incorporates a distinction between prox i mate and remote causes. But Smith's account agrees with the more general idea that science essentially involves reasoning from effects to causes and back. Although we fi rst know the effect (and only later the cause), in nature ("ordo naturae") the cause takes place fi rst.
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In 1687, the year in which the fi rst edition of Newton's Principia appeared, John Wallis published his Institutio logicae. 54 Newton did not own a private copy of it. The work was, how ev er, dedicated to the offi cers and Fellows of the Royal Society and what he said on method was intended primarily for young natural philosophers. 55 Wallis is known primarily as a math e ma ti cian, his Arithmetica infi nitorum (1655) being his best-known work. In "Caput XV De Inductione & Exemplo" of the third part, Wallis discusses induction as a type of imperfect syl lo gism where one proceeds from particulars to a universal. Experimental philosophy ("Philosophia Experimentalis") proceeds from effects to causes:
For although in the order of nature the progression is from causes to effects, yet in the order of knowing the progression is from observed effects to the investigation of causes. And indeed in the magnetic effects which I have already observed before (and that originally in a concrete case, I believe), that a magnet attracts iron and points to the north, no one would know or indeed suspect such a thing from the nature of the magnet. And so equally in many other things.
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Again we encounter demonstrative regressus. In the speculative sciences the method is to begin with the cause (or what is fi rst in regard to way of operating) and from there to proceed to the effect; or alternatively to begin with the subject (the name, nature, and species which are fi rst investigated) and thence to proceed to ac ci dents, adjuncts, properties, and relations, along with the principles and causes of these last....
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The speculative sciences consist of two methods: one used for investigation (analysis) and one for teaching or education (synthesis). The fi rst proceeds from individuals to universals ("a Particularibus ad Universalia procedit"); the second proceeds in the opposite direction. 58 Finally, Wallis discusses the use of method in mathematics where one begins with laying down defi ni tions, citing axioms and postulates, and proving propositions from them.
THE EFFECTS OF THE TEXTBOOKS ON NEWTON
In this section I will indicate the parallels between these textbooks and Newton's ideas on nat u ral philosophy, focusing on the Principia. In 3.1 I will briefl y analyse Newton's writings (no ta bly the Lucasian lectures, Opticks and the Principia) and compare them with the ideas presented in the previous section. It will turn out that Newton's natural philosophy, even in its early form, always had a strong causal interpretation. In 3.2 I will examine Newton's explanations in the Principia in more detail. It will be shown that Newton conceived centripetal forces as proximate causes. First he inferred them (analysis), then he used them to explain effects (synthesis).
Newton on Scientifi c Explanation
There are many places in which Newton stresses the importance of proceeding from effects to causes. Let me give a brief overview. At the beginning of the Principia Newton declared:
For the basic problem of philosophy seems to be to discover the forces of nature from the phenomena of motions and then to demonstrate the other phenomena from these forces. 60 The true forces of nature were unknown. In the scholium to the defi nitions, Newton wrote:
But in what follows, a fuller explanation will be given of how to determine true motions from their causes, effects, and apparent differences, and conversely, of how to determine from motions, whether true or apparent, their causes and ef fects. 61 Newton spoke of gravity as a causal entity. 62 In Opticks (fi rst edition: 1704) he wrote that the main business of natural philosophy is "to argue from Phaenomena without feigning Hypotheses, and to deduce 63 Causes from Effects". 64 In Query 31 he wrote:
As in Mathematicks, so in Natural Philosophy, the Investigation of diffi cult Things by the Method of Analysis, ought ever to precede the Method of Composition. This Analysis consists in making Experiments and Observations, and in drawing general Conclusions from them by Induction, and admitting of no Objections against the Conclusions, but such as are taken from Experiments, or other certain Truths. For hypotheses are not to be regarded in experimental Philosophy.... By this way of Analysis we may proceed from Compounds to Ingredients, and from Motions to the Forces producing them; and in general, from Effects to their Caus es, and from particular Causes to more general ones, till the Argument end in the most general. This is the Method of Synthesis: And the method of Synthesis consists in assuming the Causes discover'd and establish'd as Principles, and by them explaining the phaenomena proceeding from them, and proving the Ex pla na tions. 65 Natural philosophy consists in two kinds of demonstrations: fi rst from effects to causes (the analysis) and then from causes to effects (the synthesis). The parallels with the authors of the textbooks on logic should be clear by now. Another point may be added. Let us look at the following famous quotation:
Thus far I have explained the phenomena of the heavens and of our sea by the force of gravity, but I have not yet assigned a cause to gravity. Indeed, this force arises from some cause that penetrates as far as the centers of the sun and planets without diminution of its power to act, and that acts not in proportion to the quan ti ty of the surfaces of the particles on which it acts (as mechanical causes are wont to do) but in proportion to the quantity of solid matter, and whose action is ex tend ed everywhere to immense distances, always decreasing as the squares of the distances.... And it is enough that gravity really exists and acts according to certain laws that we have set forth and is suffi cient to explain all the motions of the heavenly bodies. 66 Newton took this to mean that he had proved gravity as a primary or proximate cause for the heavenly and terrestrial motions, but that he had not succeeded in discovering a further sec ond ary or remote cause for gravity. This is confi rmed by an unpublished draft intended for the Scholium Generale. Newton wrote as follows:
First, the phenomena should be observed, then their proximate causes -and afterward the causes of the causes -should be investigated, and fi nally it will be possible to come down from the causes of the causes (established by phenomena) to their effects, by arguing a priori. 67 Newton, like Smith, is thinking in terms of proximate and remote causes, along the lines of demonstratio quod types 1 and 2. He endorsed the difference between immediate causes and the highest level. 68 His thinking about nature always was in causal terms. But in his physical work, as in his optical work, he succeeded only in demonstrating the primary causes: in physics the force of gravitation, in optics the heterogeneity of white light. Many authors have taken New ton's explanations as anti-causal phenomenalism. But this is to neglect the causal language Newton used on several occasions. I have already pointed out several causal fragments from the Principia -which we will discuss in the following section -and Opticks. Newton's early optical work also testifi ed to a causal outlook on scientifi c explanation. In his 1672 paper on light and colour Newton conceived of the heterogeneity of light as a cause, 69 and in his Lucasian lectures on optics (1670-72), he was even more explicit on his causal outlook: But had they suffi ciently examined the cause of these colors, the inequal re frangi bil i ty of different rays would have immediately become known, and hence it would have been established that the defects of telescopes do not derive from the unsuitability of a spherical shape to perform refractions properly. 70 The heterogeneity of white light is also considered to be a cause. Likewise for the explanation of other phenomena:
Besides the phenomena of the colors that we have treated, there are still not a few others (especially the colors of very thin transparent plates, such as the aqueous globes of bubbles, air compressed between two plates, and very thin skins of many bodies) whose causes and measures can scarcely be accurately determined without mathematical reasoning.
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After Newton had discovered the cause of colours, he explained other phenomena (such as the rainbow) not originally among those used in establishing the heterogeneity of white light by means of this cause. The following fragment seems to be an early adumbration of the anal y sis-synthesis part in Opticks. First we discover causes from some effects, then assuming these causes we explain other phenomena:
Thus far I have erected the foundations whereby the phenomena of colors produced in any way can be explained, but now I will describe individually the particular and immediate causes of the effects that I have not previously treated, not for the sake of the geometers (to whom, it will appear unnecessary) but for others. 72 This indicates that Newton's conception of scientifi c explanation was causal from his earliest scientifi c works on.
Many scholars have neglected Newton's causal parlance. According to Ernan McMullin, in the Principia Newton's innovative approach "appeared to allow him to dispense with the troubling hypothetical element that the search for causal explanation had led his predecessors to admit into physics". 73 McMullin argues that the Principia offers "dynamical explanation" and that Newton's talk of attraction and forces is merely dispositional; but the present writer's opin ion is that Newton's language is essentially phenomenal.
Alan Shapiro also stresses the phenomenal character of Newton's optical work. 74 Both McMullin and Shapiro claim that Bernard Cohen's "Newtonian Style" supports their views. McMullin explicitly claims that Cohen's account precludes abductive reasoning. 75 However, that this claim is unwarranted can be seen from the following: Cohen states that, in commenting on Book I, Propositions 1-3, Newton had demonstrated that a mathematically descriptive law of motion was shown by mathematics to be equivalent to a set of causal conditions of forces and motions. 76 Given that the laws of motion are valid, Newton is able to deduce that the area law is caused by its necessary and suffi cient causal condition: a centripetal force. 77 This would allow reasoning from effects to causes. These centripetal forces are real entities and hence the real causes of the celestial motions we observe. However, Newton remains agnostic about the further explanation and cause of these centripetal forces. What physically causes gravity, is postponed to a later moment. These phenomenalist accounts are at odds not only with Newton's frequent usage of causal talk, they are also incompatible with Newton's practice in the Principia, as we will now see.
Explanation in the Principia
I will argue that Newton not only favoured causal explanation (as is shown in 3.1), but actually offered it. It is not my aim here to treat Newton's use of regressus exhaustively. I will limit myself to his use of it in the beginnings of Book III (Systema mundi) of the Principia. Newton introduced a new causal entity, "Universal Gravitation", which was completely different from the Aristotelian notion of cause. By means of abstract mathematics he was able to demonstrate that the force of gravity is the cause of the motion of the celestial and terrestrial bodies. Let us focus on Newton's abductive reasoning steps in Book III. I start with Propositions 1 and 2, where Newton deals with the dynamical implications of Kepler's second law:
Book I, Proposition 1: The areas which bodies made to move in orbits describe by radii drawn to an unmoving center of forces lie in unmoving planes and are pro por tion al to the times. 78 The proof proceeds as follows (see Figure 1) . Let a body by its inherent force, i.e. by its vis inertiae, describe the straight line AB. After B the body would normally (by Law 1) go straight to c. Let cC be parallel to BS and meet BC at C. A second force acts on B and makes it deviate from Bc and follow BC (by Corollary 1 of the laws of motion). When the second part of the time has been completed -the time is divided in equal intervals and the force acts instantaneously after each such interval -the body will be found at C in the same plane as triangle ASB. Since SB and Cc are parallel, triangle SBC will be equal to SBc and thus to SAB. SBC and SBc are equal since both their heights and their bases are equal. That their bases SB are equal is evident. The height is the same in each because both triangles are between the parallels SB and Cc. Hence they describe an equal area in an equal amount of time.
By a similar argument this can be extended to all triangles. If the number of triangles is increased infi nitely, one can still apply the same reasoning: they will describe equal areas in equal times. Proposition 1 is essentially based on: the fi rst law of motion, Corollary 1 of the laws, and a limiting procedure. 79 Several interesting suppositions are made: the inertial component is vis u al ized as Bc, Cd, De, Ef, ...; the centripetal force as cC, dD, eE, fF, ...; the resulting force of these forces as BC, CD, DE, EF, .... This model is a one-body system, i.e. a system with one point mass drawn towards an empty point.
Let us now turn to Proposition 2.
Book I, Proposition 2: Every body that moves in some curved line described in a plane and, by a radius drawn to a point, either unmoving or moving uniformly for ward with a rectilinear motion, describes areas around that point proportional to the times, is urged by a centripetal force tending toward that same point.
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Proposition 2 amounts to saying that Kepler's second law (which supposes a constant areal ve loc i ty and equality of the plane of motion) presupposes a centripetal force (thus: it demonstrates the converse of Proposition 1). Newton shows that a centripetal force is a necessary (Proposition 1) and suffi cient (Proposition 2) cause for Kepler's area law: Kepler's area law is valid if and only if there is a centripetal force. 81 The proof proceeds as follows (again see Figure 1 ). By Newton's fi rst law we know that a body that moves in a curved line is defl ected from a rectilinear course by some force acting on it. The force that defl ects the body and makes it describe in equal times around an immoveable point S the equal minimally small triangles SAB, SBC, SCD, ... acts along a line par al lel to cC, i.e. along the line BS; at point C, it acts parallel to the line dD, i.e. along CS; and so on. Therefore it always acts along lines tending towards S. Similar suppositions are made as in the previous proposition.
We now proceed to Proposition 4.
Book I, Proposition 4, Corollary 6: If the periodic times are as 3/2 powers of the radii, and therefore the velocities are inversely as the square roots of the radii, the centripetal forces will be inversely as the squares of the radii; and conversely. 82 The reasoning proceeds as follows. In Proposition 4 Newton had already proved that the magnitude of this force is proportional to v²/r. Corollary 6 shows that this fact combined with Kepler's har mon ic law delivers an inverse square law and vice versa. In modern terminology this can be dem on strat ed as follows (Newton does not give any further comment to this corollary). Huygens pub lished the result that a body travelling in a circle with constant angular speed needs a force pro por tion al to v²/r to keep it in orbit: F = kv²/r. Since v equals 2πr/t, F = k4π²r²/t²r. Multiplying by r/r, we have F = k4π²r³/t²r². Since r³/t² is a constant according to Kepler's third law, we can write: F = (constant)/r². Thus, Kepler's third law implies an inverse square law, and conversely. The real world is not the subject of Book I; Book I lacks physical content. 83 As such, Book I is written with the purpose of demonstrating what will be the case if certain physical conditions hold (neglecting at that moment the real conditions in the actual world). Put differently: it is an investigation of what follows from the laws of motion given certain force functions. It is an enterprise different from that undertaken by Newton in Book III, the Systema mundi. Book I is an investigation of the mathematical consequences that follow from certain physical conditions, i.e. an "investigation of those quantities of forces and their proportions that follow from any conditions that may be supposed". Then "coming down to physics", i.e. in the process of explaining real-world motions, one starts by looking at which mathematical properties are present in nature and infers from this which mechanisms are active (cf. "these proportions must be compared with the phenomena, so that it may be found out which conditions (or laws) of forces apply to each kind of attracting bodies"). 84 In other words: from the mathematical properties present in nature one infers the physical agents. 85 Bernard Cohen states, in commenting on Propositions 1-3 of Book I, that Newton was able to demonstrate that a mathematically descriptive law of motion was shown by mathematics to be equivalent to a set of causal conditions of forces and motions. 86 Newton is arguing from effects (Kepler's laws, or Kepler's rules as they were called at the time) to causes (centripetal forces). Newton's method is far more complex than characterized here. 87 It in cor po rates many features of Smith's account (e.g., the idea of systematic dependencies), but is explicitly "model-based". Newton starts with a set of physical conditions, P x , and next he deduces the math e mat i cal properties, M x . Newton then observes some empirical regularities which can be expressed mathematically (M x ) and fi nally concludes to P x . This amounts to abduction:
(
The astonishing feature of Newton's method is that he allows for quam proxime "if-then" prop o si tions. 88 For instance in Book I, Proposition 65, of the Principia, he is able to infer that in a many-body system in which several smaller bodies orbit around one greater body by an inverse-square law (i.e., P x ), the area law will hold very nearly (i.e. M x (quam proxime)). 89 We obtain propositions of the kind:
These reasoning steps can then be reconstructed as: Book I, Proposition 2, allows one to conclude that Kepler's second law entails a centripetal force. So we could say that one can "deduce" a centripetal force from Kepler's second law. However, in the natural order it is the centripetal force that produces or causes motion that conforms to Kepler's second law. That is why it amounts to abduction. This agrees with Newton remark on "arguing from Effects to Causes". The essential thing is that the conditional sentences in (1) are deduced from the laws of motion. We establish that if P x (a centripetal force) is active then M x (e.g. the arealaw) holds. Then we observe that M x holds very nearly. From this we can abductively infer that P x is the cause of the observed mathematical regularities. This is a striking feature of Newton's methodology. This interpretation also enables one to alleviate the apparent tension between the fact that these models do not exhaustively describe the actual world and Newton's realistic-causal stance. The awareness of this incongruence can be found in various statements of Book III. 90 Although these propositions do not exactly coincide with na ture, they can teach us something about the causal agents in the world. This was of the greatest importance to Newton.
Newton surely must have thought that he provided causal explanations in the Principia. This was not in the strong causal-agent sense nor in the traditional Aristotelian sense, since Newton admits that he did not assign the cause of the gravity that "penetrates" the cosmos. 91 But how then are we to understand this sense? In my opinion there is only one option: to take Newton's causal parlance at face value. He conceptualized gravity as a proximate cause. The cause of this proximate cause is left unspecifi ed. Newton's notion of cause was broader than a purely mechanical notion. Newton is inferring instances of centripetal forces. Gravity provides explanations as a proximate cause. Gerd Buchdahl makes clear that we should make the distinction between "the logical status of gravity itself, as a 'primary' cause, and the modus operandi, if any, of a secondary explanatory mechanism for gravity". 92 What Newton was doing here, was not -at least considered from a general methodological perspective -new: he was proceeding from effects to (proximate) caus es. However, Newton proposed a radically new kind of causal entity: a non-mechanical entity inferred by means of abstract mathematics. 93 Most contemporaries, such as Leibniz and Huygens, criticized Newton for not giving a physical, i.e. mechanical, explanation of gravity. They viewed Newton's force of universal gravitation as an occult quality.
On of the more careful observers, the Jesuit Castel, criticized Newton because there was nothing "physical" in Newton's abstract demonstrations. 94 They were purely mathematical. It is far from obvious how they -in virtue of being purely mathematical -can explain physical be hav iour. The novelty involved in Newton's method baffl ed most of his contemporaries. 95 Nevertheless, gravity was a causal entity for Newton and he thought that mathematics could unravel the un der ly ing causes in nature. After some unifi cation steps, where Newton identifi es the various centripetal forces in our solar system, he arrives at universal gravitation. 96 It is here that the synthetical moment of science enters the scene. The synthesis starts after Proposition 8 and extends to the very end of Book III. Newton shows that the motion of the planets, the motion of the Moon, the tides, and the motion of comets can all be deduced from the causes proposed by the theory of universal gravitation. So in the synthesis we assume "the Causes discover'd and establish'd as Prin ci ples, and by them explaining the phaenomena proceeding from them, and proving the Ex pla na tions". This is identical to Smith's demonstratio propter quid: proceeding from proximate causes to effects. At its most general, abstract form, Newton was using the strategy of regressus, reasoning to causes and back. He radically modifi ed the content of the notion 'cause'. This Aristotelian text book tradition perceived science as a dual process of proceeding from effects to causes and then from causes to effects. Newton's explicit usage of analysis-synthesis in a causal way emerged as he introduced a new causal entity: universal gravitation. Newton recast his innovating scientifi c dem on stra tions in an Aristotelian terminology.
CONCLUSION
The impact of these textbooks is limited to what I have termed 'general' features of Newton's view on natural philosophy. These textbooks conceive of natural philosophy as a dual process: its fi rst moment is regressive, the unravelling of proximate causes (and if possible the causes of these causes, i.e. the remote causes) of the effects we observe; the second is progressive, the postulating of proximate causes (and if possible, of remote causes) in order to demonstrate their effects. New ton, although he was reforming the very notion of cause, took over the Aristotelian terminology of explaining phenomena by arguing from effects to causes and conversely. They are representative of certain aspects of the intellectual climate of the seventeenth century. When we juxtapose New ton's work to these textbooks, Newton's causal outlook comes as no surprise.
My analysis also helps to explain why Newton did not endorse a probabilistic account of natural philosophy. Newton's stress on causes and certain knowledge was at odds with the general climate at the Royal Society. 97 Newton favoured certain knowledge, and disliked hypotheses. 98 Certain knowledge includes knowing the causes of things. Contrary to the spirit of Bacon, most natural philosophers of the Royal Society endorsed a probabilistic view on human knowledge, which included hypotheses. 99 In their willingness to accept probability they "moved away not only from thinkers like Hobbes, but even from Bacon (and for that matter, from Aristotle)". 100 People could arrive only at morally certain knowledge. They could not know nature "in their true im me di ate, necessary causes". 101 Newton thought otherwise. This case-study indicates the need for futher research into such questions. 102 We are not claiming that Newton was an Aristotelian concerning all his ideas on science, or that these text books are the only relevant sources for his conception of science. Newton's abstract, mathematical way of dealing with force was surely unprecedented. It is obvious that the abductive mathematical propositions in Book I are mathematized in a way that was not carried through to a conclusion. There certainly remain questions. These textbooks are only the tip of the iceberg. What lies be neath, i.e. the relations between these and other books, remains unclear. Were the works I men tioned important to other natural philosophers? Are there further relevant textbooks? How exactly was this textbook tradition introduced and assimilated in seventeenth-century England? 103 Was there a relation or mutual connection between Hobbes and Bacon? What was the role of these textbooks in this? What was the role of these books in the milieu of the Royal Society? What is the link between Newton and Hobbes? These are questions that merit investigation.
